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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS IN NEW YORK
In our increasingly mobile society an employee's work may take
him to several states. Since he has contacts with each, it may be unclear
in which state the employment relationship is located. If injured in
the course of such employment, the employee may seek compensation
in the most convenient forum' or in the state offering the highest rate
of compensation. 2 The state or states in which recovery is sought must
then determine whether their statutes apply. If each state decides that
the accident is more properly the concern of another, the employee
may be denied all recovery; if more than one state allows compensation, the employer might be forced to pay a double award. An arbitrary or mechanical rule may deny compensation for some injuries
in which the state has a legitimate interest, and thereby frustrate the
practical and humanitarian objectives of a workmen's compensation
system.
Practicalities usually preclude one state from applying the workmen's compensation law of another, 3 since in most states a claim may
be brought only through a special workmen's compensation board or
other administrative body.4 But there are few constitutional limitations on the power of states to apply their own statutes in adjudicating claims arising from out-of-state accidents. The full faith and
credit clause was once held to preclude the forum from applying its
own law if the accident was of greater concern to another state.5
Placing greater emphasis on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court has since recognized that several states
may have a legitimate interest in the same accident, and that each may
I

Every state now has a workmen's compensation statute. See 2 A. LARSON, WORKA-C) (1961) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
under the various state statutes differs considerably. See id. at 524-53 (Appendix B).
3 A state may constitutionally apply the workmen's compensation law of another
state. Cf. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (dictum).
4 See, e.g., Grenier v. Alta Crest Farms, Inc, 115 Vt. 324, 58 A.2d 884 (1948) and
cases cited therein. But see Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co. 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395
(1935), in which Mississippi applied the Louisiana compensation act, which is court
administered.
5 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). In this case claimant's
decedent was killed while on a casual trip to New Hampshire in the course of his employment. All other incidents of the employment were in Vermont. Claimant elected to
bring a common law action for wrongful death in New Hampshire, whose compensation
act permitted such election. The Court held that the Vermont compensation act was a
defense to this action since it barred recourse to actions based on tort.
MEN'S COMPENSATION 509-61 (Appendices
2 The amount of recovery allowed
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apply its own law. 6 The state in which the injury takes place can always
apply its statute, 7 as can any other state which has a substantial connection with the employer-employee relationship."
Although more than one state can constitutionally apply its act,
there is no possibility of double recovery. It is settled that recovery
under the compensation act of one state does not preclude an award
by another state for the same injury, if the employer receives credit
for the prior award. 9 It is better to assure an employee the maximum
award to which he is legally entitled than it is to protect the employer
from a series of compensation claims. 10
The states have seldom exerted jurisdiction to the fullest extent
constitutionally permissible. Indeed, by the time the Supreme Court
defined the constitutional limitations, most states had already adopted
more limited tests for determining the extraterritorial reach of their
statutes. Some early cases treated workmen's compensation as a statutory tort and applied the torts conflict rule, usually lex loci delicti.1 1

This approach was soon abandoned, and courts began to apply the
local statute to some out-of-state accidents. Many states adopted the
contract theory, 1 2 under which employment contracts were viewed as
incorporating the compensation act of the state in which the contract
was formed.18 But exclusive reliance on contract technicalities may
6 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), in
which the Court allowed California to apply its statute to the claim of a workman injured
in Alaska. The Court said that either state could, consistently with due process, apply
either workmen's compensation law. The employee had been hired in California and
returned there following his accident. Since he was not paid until his return to California
and probably could not have afforded another trip to Alaska to prosecute a claim there,
he might have become a public charge of California. Thus California was deemed to have
a legitimate public interest.
7 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
8 Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947).
9 See Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947); RESrATEMENT OF CONFLiCT OF LAws §§ 402-03 (1934) [hereinafter cited as R-TATEMENT]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICt or LAws §§ 402-03 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964), [hereinafter cited as REsrATEMENT (SECOND)]. Contra, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). It was
suggested in Rounsaville v. Central R.R., 87 N.J.L. 371, 874, 94 A. 892, 393 (Sup. Ct. 1915),
that a complete double recovery under the acts of two states might be possible. This would
occur only in rare situations such as when an employee is performing services for two
employers located in different states under circumstances making both state statutes applicable. Shelby Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 112 Ind. App. 627, 44 N.E.2d 315 (1942).
10 See LMSON § 85.60.
11 North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 P. 93 (1916); Gould's Case,
215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693 (1913).
1. See IA SON § 87-11 & pp. 520-21 (Appendix A, table 6).
13 See, e.g., Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372 (1915); Ohlhausen v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 218 La. 677, 50 So. 2d 803 (1951); Filson v. Bell Tel.
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bring within the jurisdiction of the state some accidents in which the
state has no real interest. 14
Under another theory, a state would apply its statute extraterritorially only when it is the place of regular employment or the place
where the employment relationship is located. 15 This practice has been
termed the most relevant to compensation theory and the least artificial; 16 but it is often difficult to determine where an abstract relationship is located, especially when the employment is transitory.
Other rules, which have achieved no general acceptance, range
from a simple refusal to apply the local statute to any injury occurring
in another state,'y to complicated statutory and judicial tests that
8
weigh a myriad of factors.1

Labs., Inc., 82 N.J. Super. 185, 191, 197 A.2d 196, 199 (App. Div. 1964); N.J. Rav. STAT. §
34:15-9 (1937); Rothman, Conflict of Laws in Labor Matters in the United States, 12 VAND.
L. REv. 997, 1001-02 (1959). See also REsTATENMENT § 398.
14 See LARSON § 87.34; Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws,
11 MINN. L. Rv. 329, 33745 (1927).
15 LARSON § 87.12.
16 LARsON § 87.41.
17 Oklahoma originally applied this extreme rule on extraterritoriality. Battiest v.
State Indus. Comm'n, 197 Okla. 618, 173 P.2d 922 (1946); Sheehan Pipe Line Constr. Co.
v. State Indus. Comm'n, 151 Okla. 272, 3 P.2d 199 (1931); Beck v. Davis, 175 Okla. 623,
626, 54 P.2d 371, 373 (1936) (dictum). Since its amendment in 1955, the Oklahoma statute
applies only when the accidental injury or the entering of the contract took place in
Oklahoma. Scotty's Flying & Dusting Serv., Inc. v. Neeser, 393 P.2d 842 (Okla. 1964);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 4 (Supp. 1966).
18 See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-16-1 to 81-16-3 (1963). Reciprocity requirements
and time limitations have been added to the general test which was developed by the
Colorado courts. (No recovery is allowed in Colorado unless 2 of the following 3 conditions are met: contract of employment created in Colorado; employment in Colorado
under a contract created outside the state; substantial employment in Colorado.) The
statute itself has been further refined by judicial interpretation. Denver Truck Exch. v.
Perryman, 134 Colo. 586, 597, 307 P.2d 805, 812 (1957); State Compensation Ins. Fund v.
Howington, 133 Colo. 583, 298 P.2d 963 (1956). See also United States Fidel. & Guar. Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Colo. 280, 284, 61 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1936) (decided before the
adoption of these statutory provisions).
The courts of Minnesota and Wisconsin have attempted to find a concrete status
which can be fixed in a given state. Minnesota looks to the place where the business is
"localized." See, e.g., Hubbard v. Midland Constructors, Inc., 269 Minn. 425, 131 N.W2d
209 (1964); Krekelberg v. M. A. Floyd Co., 166 Minn. 149, 207 N.W. 193 (1926); State
ex rel. Chambers v. District Court, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N.W. 185 (1918). If the business is
clearly established both in the state of injury and in Minnesota, compensation is granted
under the Minnesota act only if the particular services involved are "referable" to the
Minnesota business. The Hubbard case implies that the Minnesota act may be construed

to apply more broadly whenever there are substantial business connections or personal
ties.
Wisconsin requires that the claimant have "status" as a workman in Wisconsin before
he can recover compensation. Every workman in the state is deemed to have at least
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Most states assume jurisdiction over all accidents occurring within
their borders, regardless of the contacts the employment has with other
states. 19 But a few states do not apply their statutes even to in-state
accidents when the employment is deemed to be the concern of an20
other state.

THE NEW YORK STATUTE

New York's workmen's compensation law provides that an employer
must compensate his employees for injuries arising out of and in the
course of their employment. 21 But the statute does not specify its
applicability to claims that also concern a sister state, and judicial
interpretation has failed to yield any clear test for what constitutes
New York employment. The recent cases of Rutledge v. Al. G. Kelly &
Miller Brothers Circus and Rhodes v. Mushroom TransportationC0.22
again brought this question before the court of appeals. In its attempt
to define the jurisdiction of the New York Workmen's Compensation
Board, the court once more found it necessary to exhume a series of
past decisions in order to determine their effect on the New York rule.
temporary status, which is lost upon leaving if he has no additional ties with the state.
Perfect Seal Rock Wool Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 257 Wis. 133, 42 N.W.2d 449
(1950); Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 466, 474-76, 234 N.W. 889,
892-93 (1931). An employee who has worked for a Wisconsin employer covered by the act
or who has otherwise obtained status as a Wisconsin employee retains constructive status
in Wisconsin even while working elsewhere, and can obtain compensation under the
Wisconsin statute for out-of-state injuries until he acquires actual status in another state.
Western Condensing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 262 Wis. 458, 461-62, 55 N.W.2d 363, 365
(1952); McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 212 Wis. 507, 512-14, 250
N.W. 396, 398-99 (1933). A resident of Wisconsin who is hired in the state is covered by
the act regardless of where he is injured or where his services are rendered, while an
employee who neither is a resident of Wisconsin nor renders services there is not covered
for an accident outside the state regardless of where the contract for employment was
formed. Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra at 472, 234 N.W. at 891.
19 E.g., Beck v. Davis, 175 Okla. 623, 626, 54 P.2d 371, 373-74 (1936); Interstate Power
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 466, 475-76, 234 N.W. 889, 892-93 (1931); see LARSON
§ 87.22. Such accidents clearly fall within the police power of the state. Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 237-38 (1916).
20 Most of the states that do not apply their statutes to all accidents occurring within
their borders provide that coverage be exempted only when the accident is covered by
the statute of another state. See, e.g., CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 81-16-1 (1964); ORF. Rv.
STAT. § 656.126(2) (1965). Contra, House v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 167 Ore. 257, 117
P.2d 611 (1941). There is still some question whether New York will apply its statute to
all accidents within the state. See pp. 158-59 9- notes 42-47 infra.
21 N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAw § 10 (McKinney 1965).
If
22 Decided together. 18 N.Y.2d 464, 223 N.E.2d 334, 276 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966).
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A. ExtraterritorialApplication
23
In its earliest decision on the issue, Post v. Burger & Gohlke,
the court of appeals held that an accident need not take place in New
York in order to occur in the course of New York employment. The
court rejected the tort theory of liability and seemed to adopt the contract theory. But contrary to the implications of Post, the court two
years later made it clear that the formation of the contract in New York
would not necessarily bring an out-of-state accident within the provisions of the New York statute.2 4 Thus, it was still uncertain what constituted New York employment.
1. The Cameron "FixedEmployment" Test
The most influential decision on the extraterritorial effect of the
New York statute was Cameron v. Ellis ConstructionCo.25 Claimant was
a resident of Canada who had worked in Canada at a sand pit near the
New York border. He continued to work in the sand pit for a new employer, a Massachusetts corporation building a road in New York, and
was injured in the course of that employment. The Industrial Board
awarded compensation based on an injury incidental to a hazardous
industrial enterprise in New York. The court of appeals reversed,
Judge Lehman writing:
The statute imposes upon every employer, foreign or domestic,
the duty to secure to his workmen compensation for injuries,
wherever sustained, arising out of and in the course of employment located here. Absence of a workman from the State in the

course of such employment does not interrupt that duty where
the duty has been imposed upon the employer under the statute.
It has not been imposed upon the employer in connection with
employment located outside the State. The test in all cases is the V"
place where the employment is located.
When the course of employment requires the workman to

perform work beyond the borders of the State, a close question
may at times be presented as to whether the employment itself is
located here. Determination of that question may at times depend
upon the relative weight to be given under all the circumstances
to opposing considerations. The facts in each case, rather than
juristic concepts, will govern such determination. Occasional
transitory work beyond the State may reasonably be said to be

work performed in the course of employment here; employment
confined to work at a fixed place in another State is not employ216 N.Y. 544, 111 N.E 351 (1916).
24 See Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 224 N.Y. 9, 119 N.E. 878 (1918).
25 252 N.Y. 394, 169 N.E. 622 (1930).
23
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ment within the State, for this State is concerned only remotely,
if at all, with the conditions of such employment .... 2 6
The distinction between work at a fixed location outside the state and
transitory work beyond state borders became the governing criterion
in subsequent cases.
2.

Confusion Following Cameron

On its facts, Cameron was properly decided; and the opinion
seemed to endorse flexibility in determining where the employment is
located. But Cameron, like decisions before and since, failed to spell
out any policy or social purpose that would be helpful in determining
how the rule it laid down should be interpreted. Instead the court
searched for a controlling objective factor that could be used as an
absolute indicator of the employment's location. Although Judge
Lehman stated that all the circumstances in a given case must be considered, subsequent courts, lured by the apparent certainty of the fixed
employment test, adopted as the controlling factor the mobility of work
27
done outside New York.
In many cases the mobility of work done outside New York is, in
fact, the single most important consideration. An employee who once
worked in New York but who has since been transferred to.,! permanent location elsewhere is no longer a New York employee. (imilarly,
an employee hired in New York to work at a particular place in another state, or hired by a New York employer in another state to work
in that state, is not a New York employee. In such cases the fixed
employment test leads to the proper result; compensation is denied
under the New York statute, because the employment is not of local
concern.8At the same time, an employee who spends most or all of
his time outside New York but who never locates at a particular situs
outside the state may continue to be related most closely to New York.
The fixed employment test is equally successful here; New York has
properly allowed the claims of transitory employees such as travelling
salesmen, 29 interstate bus drivers,30 and airplane pilots.3 1
26 Id. at

397-98, 169 N.E. at 623.

27 The courts at first refused to apply the fixed employment test as a rigid rule.
See Smith v. Aerovane Util. Corp., 259 N.Y. 126, 181 N.E. 72 (1932). But see id. at 151,
181 N.E. at 74 (Lehman, J., dissenting). But often the rule was strictly applied to
deny compensation for claims in which New York had a real interest. E.g., Amaxis v.
N.A. Vassilaros, Inc., 258 N.Y. 544, 180 N.E. 325 (1931).
28 E.g., Bagdalik v. Flexlume Corp., 281 N.Y. 858, 24 N.E.2d 499 (1939); Copeland v.
Foundation Co., 256 N.Y. 568, 177 N.E. 143 (1931); Stephens v. Hudson Maintenance Co.,
274 App. Div. 1077, 85 N.Y.S.2d 505 (3d Dep't 1949).
29 Roth v. A.C. Horn Co., 287 N.Y. 545, 38 N.E.2d 221 (1941); Flinn v. Remington
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But mere mobility is not the only important factor, nor is it
always easy to determine. When employment settles at a particular

out-of-state location until a given job is finished, the question is presented whether successive jobs in different locations constitute one
continuous employment or several individual employments, each tied
to the particular state where the work is done. 32 Work done outside
the state but directed and controlled from within may have significant
contacts with New York.33 When a New York resident is hired in the
state to work elsewhere, and then returns home disabled by an industrial accident, the state is legitimately concerned. 34 In deciding whether
to award compensation in these more difficult cases, judges often

seemed to rely primarily upon an instinctive feeling of what constitutes
New York employment or upon the particular employee's need for
protection. Yet, courts usually paid lip service to the fixed employment
test, and as a result some fine and often inconsistent factual distinctions
were made. 35
3. Nashko and the Significant Contacts Test
The need for a positive restatement of New York's position and for
on criteria other than the mobility of out-of-state employemphasis
an
ment was finally met in Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing Co.36 The
New York board had awarded compensation to an employee working
in New Jersey, because the employment was so closely tied to New
York.37 The appellate division reversed, holding that under the
Rand, Inc., 277 N.Y. 641, 14 N.E2d 199 (1938); Wagoner v. Brown Mfg. Co., 274 N.Y.
593, 10 N.E.2d 567 (1937); Reiss v. Standard Garment Co., 281 App. Div. 720, 117 N.Y.S.2d
847 (3d Dep't 1952); Baduski v. S. Gumpert Co., 277 App. Div. 591, 102 N.Y.S.2d 297
(3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 202 N.Y. 702, 98 N.E.2d 491 (1951).
30 Etters v. Trailways of New England, Inc., 266 App. Div. 929, 43 N.Y.S.2d 884 (3d
Dep't 1943).
31 Cf. Spelar v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1947);
Tallman v. Colonial Air Transp., Inc., 259 N.Y. 512, 182 N.E. 159 (1932).
32 See, e.g., Cradduck v. Hallen Co., 304 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E.2d 61 (1952).
33 Many cases emphasized this factor in finding that New York had jurisdiction.
E.g., Roth v. A.C. Horn Co., 287 N.Y. 545, 38 N.E.2d 221 (1941); Flinn v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 277 N.Y. 641, 14 N.E.2d 199 (1938). But see Shorr v. U-Vanna-Wash Frocks, Inc., 284
App. Div. 778, 135 N.Y.S.2d 143 (3d Dep't 1954) (per curiam).
34 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 542 (1935).
35 Compare Cradduck v. Hallen Co., 304 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E.2d 61 (1952), with Lewis v.
Knappen Tippetts Abbett Eng'r Co., 304 N.Y. 461, 108 N.E.2d 609 (1952).
30 4 N.Y.2d 199, 149 N.E.2d 859, 173 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1958).
37 The employee, who steam cleaned buildings, was hired in New York to work at
locations in both New York and New Jersey. He had been working continuously in New
Jersey for 10 months before his injury there. His employer for the New Jersey work
was technically a New Jersey corporation, but the corporation was identical to the one
that hired him in New York. Both were wholly owned by the same individual; the New
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Cameron fixed employment test the injury was not compensable.3 8
In overruling the appellate division, the court of appeals stated
that "[t]here is no fixed, invariable touchstone by which the presence
or absence of jurisdiction in cases like the present one may be determined." 39 Geographic mobility of extraterritorial work is not the sole
governing criterion. Other factors tending to show a "substantial
connection," 4 such as hiring in New York, employer payment of outof-state expenses, employee residence in New York, payment of compensation insurance in New York, and an understanding that the
employee is to return to New York after out-of-state assignments, are
significant in determining whether New York has jurisdiction. The
controlling test today is whether there are "sufficient significant contacts with this State . . . so that it can reasonably be said that the
employment is located here . . . ." The determination "is governed
'4 1
by the facts of the particular case."

B. Injuries in New York: Rutledge and Rhodes
In an effort to achieve consistency and symmetry under the
Cameron rule, the courts in two subsequent cases interpreted the fixed
42
employment test as applying to in-state as well as out-of-state injuries.
Thus, New York would not assume jurisdiction over an employee
injured in the course of temporary work in New York if the employment was fixed in another state. This reverse effect of the fixed
employment test, carried to a logical extreme, would lead to a doctrine of mutually exclusive jurisdiction under which New York would
not take jurisdiction if another state had sufficient contacts under the
New York rule to assume jurisdiction itself. The Nashko court suggested that New York might apply such a doctrine when "circumstances and elements . . . indicate that the employment is in fact
Jersey corporation was formed to comply with local laws. The employee received expenses
from his employer while in New Jersey; the employer procured the compensation insurance
in New York; and the New Jersey labor unions considered the employee a New York
worker.
38 Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 963, 163 N.Y.S.2d 165
(3d Dep't 1957), rev'd, 4 N.Y.2d 199, 149 N.E.2d 859, 173 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1958).
39 4 N.Y.2d at 200, 149 N.E.2d at 861, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
40 This test was applied in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
See p. 152 supra.
41 Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing Co., 4 N.Y.2d 199, 201, 149 N.E.2d 859, 861,
173 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (1958).
42 Whitmire v. Blaw-Knox Constr. Co., 263 N.Y. 675, 189 N.E. 753 (1934); Proper v.
Polley, 233 App. Div. 621, 253 N.Y.S. 530 (3d Dep't 1931), aff'd, 259 N.Y. 516, 182 N.E.
161 (1932).
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located in another State. '43 This was the subject for argument in
Rutledge v. Al. G. Kelly & Miller Brothers Circus and Rhodes v.
44
Mushroom TransportationCo.
The employers in Rutledge and Rhodes argued that, although the
employees were injured in New York, the employment was actually
based in another state. 4 5 It was contended that Nashko, while it enlarged the jurisdiction of New York over out-of-state accidents, had
the obverse effect of narrowing jurisdiction over accidents within the
state. The court of appeals, hearing the two cases together, refused to
apply a doctrine of mutually exclusive jurisdictions. 46 Instead, it implied that New York, because of its "primary public interest," would
assume jurisdiction over all accidents occurring within the state, "even
though control of the work, payment of wages, and employment of
the claimant all may have their roots elsewhere. '47 Whether such an
absolute rule will be followed, however, is still open to question.
Two concurring judges pointed out that the accidents in issue occurred in the course of employment planned and arranged to be
performed in New York, rather than employment which happened to
be carried out in New York on a casual, temporary, or emergency
basis. Thus, if the contacts with New York are less substantial than
those in Rutledge and Rhodes, New York might deny jurisdiction.
II
THE PRESENT NEW YoRK RULE: ITS EXPREsSION AND ITS MERITS

New York presently applies its workmen's compensation law to
any employment with which it has "sufficient significant contacts .. .
so that it can reasonably be said that the employment is located" in
New York. 41 Once employment is established in New York, jurisdic43 Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing Co., 4 N.Y.2d 199, 201, 149 N.E.2d 859, 861,
173 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (1958).
44 Decided together. 18 N.Y.2d 464, 223 N.E.2d 334, 276 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966).
45 Rutledge involved the claim of a guard hired in his home state of Arkansas to
work in a travelling circus based in Oklahoma. He was injured while the circus was
touring in New York. In Rhodes the claimant was employed as a truck driver by a
Pennsylvania corporation and injured on one of his regular trips to New York.
46 This holding is consistent with several recent lower court decisions. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 958, 221 N.Y.S.2d 225 (3d Dep't
1961). Rutledge and Rhodes were decided similarly below. 24 App. Div. 2d 521, 260
N.Y.S.2d 136 (3d Dep't 1965); 23 App. Div. 2d 421, 261 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dep't 1965). See
also Atkinson v. Marquette Mfg. Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 795, 263 N.Y.S.2d 927 (3d Dep't
1965).
47 18 N.Y.2d at 474, 223 N.E.2d at 338, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
48 Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing Co., 4 N.Y.2d 199, 201, 149 N.E.2d 859, 861,
173 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (1958); Atkinson v. Marquette Mfg. Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 795, 263

.
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tion is retained until the work becomes established elsewhere, even
though work is done outside the state.49 So long as substantial connections are maintained with New York, jurisdiction is not relinquished, even though the work is done at a fixed location in another
state; 50 nor is it relinquished when the work done outside the state
is merely transitory or temporary.51
New York has indicated that it may compensate all employees
injured in the state. 52 But if there is no other connection with the
state, status as a New York employee is lost as soon as the workman
leaves the state. Judge Desmond's concurring opinion in Rutledge,
suggesting that New York will not apply its act to an accident in the
course of casual, temporary, or emergency work done in the state,
ignores New York's interest in the safety of all employees in the state,
the possibility that the employee will become a public charge in the
state of injury, the fact that payment of local medical expenses may
have to be sought out-of-state, and the danger that the employee will
be covered by no compensation statute other than New York's. The
last result is particularly harsh. Employees injured in other states have
been denied the protection of any statute,53 a result which might well
have followed in Rutledge had New York not assumed jurisdiction. 54
N.Y.S.2d 927 (3d Dep't 1965); Levin v. Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 925,
251 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sd Dep't 1964); Solow v. Regency Thermographers, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d
859, 227 N.Y.S.2d 989 (3d Dep't 1962); Vlaisel v. Berle, 11 App. Div. 2d 831, 202 N.Y.S.2d
562 (3d Dep't 1960).
49 Solow v. Regency Thermographers, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 859, 227 N.Y.S.2d 989
(3d Dep't 1962).
50 Cf. Levin v. Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 925, 251 N.Y.S.2d
127 (3d Dep't 1964); Burton v. Ziegler Pharmacal Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 811, 192 N.Y.S.2d
509 (Sd Dep't 1959).
51 McMains v. Trans World Airlines, 18 App. Div. 2d 956, 237 N.Y.S.2d 812 (3d Dep't),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 13 N.Y.2d 593, 190 N.E.2d 905, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1963);
Clingman v. Cushman, 12 App. Div. 2d 671, 207 N.Y.S.2d 732 (3d Dep't 1960); Maisel v.
Berle, 11 App. Div. 2d 831, 202 N.Y.S.2d 562 (3d Dep't 1960); Houghton v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 575, 189 N.Y.S.2d 436 (3d Dep't 1959); Carlson v. Solomon R.
Guggenheim Foundation, 8 App. Div. 2d 892, 187 N.Y.S.2d 46 (3d Dep't 1959); Brueser v.
Blackman, 8 App. Div. 2d 872, 186 N.Y.S.2d 709 (3d Dep't 1959). The law in Wisconsin
seems analogous in many respects to the rule developing in New York. See note 18 supra.
52 An example of this is the decision in Thomas v. James E. Strates Shows, Inc., 25
App. Div. 2d 455, 265 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dep't 1966). The concept of temporary status accorded employees in Wisconsin is analogous.
53 House v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 167 Ore. 257, 117 P.2d 611 (1941).
54 In Rutledge the employment was connected with Arkansas and Oklahoma as well as
with New York. Arkansas has no extraterritorial provision in its statute and apparently
would not have applied its act in this case. Nor would the Oklahoma statute have covered
this accident. See note 16 supra.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

The development of broader tests for determining the applicability of a state workmen's compensation law 55 parallels the general
growth of the law of conflicts.5 6 Such criteria as "most significant contacts," "center of gravity," and "grouping of contacts" are employed
with increasing frequency in resolving conflicts of tort 57 (and contract58 )
law. But despite the use of similar terminology in dealing with outof-state torts and out-of-state employment injuries, the problems involved are quite different. When states with conflicting laws each have
significant contacts with the parties and events in a tort action, a
choice must be made among the laws of the interested states in order
to determine the applicable standard of conduct and relevant defenses.
No such choice is necessary when more than one state is legitimately
interested in seeing that workmen's compensation is paid.59 Since no
conflict of laws is involved, compensation for the same injury can be
sought in each interested state. The only question presented is one of
liability under the forum's own statute; 60 the relative interests of
another state are immaterial.
Many of the criticisms leveled at the use of a "significant contacts" test in tort conflicts law thus have no relevance in the context
of workmen's compensation. No mechanical counting and comparing
61
of contacts or analysis of competing foreign policies is necessary.
The argument that a "significant contacts" formula is inadequate to
55 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 398, with RSTATEMENT §§ 398-400.
56 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 332 & § 379 with RESTATEMENT

§

332 &

§§ 378-79.
57 New York's choice-of-law rule for torts is now couched in terms of weighing significant contacts and applying the law of the state most directly concerned. See Macey v.
Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d
120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d
279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
58 See, e.g., Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
59 Restatement (Second) recognizes this fact by dividing the workmen's compensation
section into separate titles on "Constitutional Law Questions" (§§ 398-403a) and "Conflict
of Laws Questions" (§§ 403b-403c). The latter title is concerned only with the power of
the state to grant recovery for wrongful death or tort when an applicable workmen's compensation law in another state bars such actions, and with the right of action against third
parties in one who has paid a workmen's compensation award. The original Restatement
§§ 398-403 considered the entire area as one of conflict of laws-hence its inclusion in the
Restatement of that title.
60 See p. 152 & notes 9-10 supra.
61 See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICt OF LAws § 142, at 400, § 174, at 463-64, § 211,
at 548 (1962); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J.
1, 34-52; Ehrenzweig, The "Bastard" in the Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace,
29 U. Cmi. L. Rav. 498 (1962).
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define a principle of law62 has no validity when significance is judged
in terms of the policies and interests of the forum state. Such terminology is at least as adequate for defining a principle of law as the
expressions "due process," "reasonableness," and "unjust enrichment." 63 Specific limitations will be developed as the need arises, but
they should remain subordinate to the ultimate goals of justice, fairness, and the best possible result. 64
It remains for subsequent cases to define more clearly the factors
that are sufficiently significant to cause New York to assume jurisdiction over workmen's compensation claims. In clarifying the relevant
factors, courts should emphasize not the occurrence of particular
factual events in a given state, but rather the ties between the state
and the parties involved. Workmen's compensation legislation is intended to serve both as a humanitarian measure for the benefit of
injured employees~and as a protection for the fiscal interests of the
state and its citizens. New York's concern with the payment of compensation stems from its interest in the welfare of the employee, the
burden of compensation on the employer, the effect of the accident on
third parties in the state (such as the employee's family and persons
seeking payment for medical services), and the possibility that the
injured employee will become a public charge of the state. Such ties
are present whenever an accident occurs within the state. Accidents
that occur outside the state and have no significant ties with New
York are constitutionally beyond the reach of its statute. But when an
injured employee has a "substantial connection" with New York, the
state has a legitimate governmental interest and should broadly construe its statute to ensure that compensation is paid.65
William B. Rozell
62 See Judge Van Voorhis's Babcock dissent. 12 N.Y.2d at 486, 191 N.E.2d at 286, 240
N.Y.S.2d at 753.
63 The United States Constitution is sufficient testimony to the merit of stating fundamental principles of law in general terms.
64 See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,
749 (1963).
65 The author is not aware of any situation in which it would be undesirable for New
York to apply its statute despite the presence of constitutionally sufficient ties with the
accident, but it is conceivable that such a situation could arise. New York's rule need not
be identical with the test for constitutionality under the Federal Constitution.

